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Differential Taxation of Interest Derived from
Out-of-State Municipal Bonds Does Not Violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause:
Department of Revenue v. Davis
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE -
DIFFERENTIAL TAXATION OF MUNICIPAL BONDS - The United
States Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth of Kentucky's
income tax scheme, which differentially taxed interest derived
from bonds issued by the Commonwealth from bonds issued by
other states, did not offend Dormant Commerce Clause principles
and, thus, was constitutional.
Department of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
The Commonwealth of Kentucky, like most states, enacted an
income tax scheme exempting from taxation interest income de-
rived from municipal bonds' issued by the Commonwealth or its
subdivisions. 2 It did not, however, extend this exemption to inter-
est income received from municipal bonds issued by other states.
3
Kentucky therefore taxed resident holders of out-of-state munici-
pal bonds differently than resident holders of similar bonds issued
by the Commonwealth. 4 The professed purpose of this differential
system was to make lower-interest bonds issued by Kentucky just
as or more attractive than higher-interest bonds issued by other
entities. 5 Kentucky would then use the proceeds from these bonds
1. A "municipal bond" is "[a] bond issued by a nonfederal government or governmental
unit, such as a state bond to finance local improvements." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 192
(8th ed. 2004).
2. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1804-05 (2008). Kentucky's scheme
taxes an individual's "net income." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.020(1) (2006). "Net income"
is computed by reference to "gross income" as defined in Section 61 the Internal Revenue
Code. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 141.010(9)-(11) (2007). Since interest on any State or
local bond is excluded under the federal statute, see I.R.C. § 103(a) (2008), it is likewise
excluded under Kentucky's tax system. See §§ 141.010(9)-(11); § 141.020(1).
3. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1805. The statute specifically includes "interest income derived
from obligations of sister states and political subdivisions thereof' within the taxable net. §
141.010(10)(c).
4. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1805. Forty-one states have laws comparable to that of Ken-
tucky. Id. at 1806-07; see, e.g., 72 PA. STAT. § 9901(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
5. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1805-06.
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to pay for various public works, such as transportation, education,
and environmental protection.6
George and Catherine Davis were two Kentucky residents who
held out-of-state municipal bonds and paid Kentucky's income tax
on the bonds' interest.7 They brought suit in state court alleging,
inter alia, that the Commonwealth's differential tax system vio-
lated the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Consti-
tution.8 Specifically, they averred that the disparate taxation un-
constitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce.9
Relying on the "market-participant" exception to the Dormant
Commerce Clause, the trial court granted the Commonwealth's
motion for summary judgment. 10 It determined that Kentucky
was doing nothing more than participating in the bond market
and thus was free to give deferential treatment to resident pur-
chasers of its bonds.
11
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky unanimously reversed.
12
Though it accepted that the Commonwealth was engaging in mar-
ket participation by issuing bonds, it distinguished that activity
from the act of taxation.' 3 According to Judge Minton, who wrote
for the court, Kentucky was not participating in the market when
it taxed the bonds but rather was engaging in regulatory activ-
ity.14 Because the tax regulation was truly at issue, and not the
bond program, the court concluded that the tax was without an
exception to save its facial discrimination.
5
6. Id. at 1806. Over a six-year period, "Kentucky and its subdivisions issued $7.7
billion in long-term bonds to pay for spending on transportation, public safety, education,
utilities, and environmental protection, among other things." Id.
7. Id. at 1807.
8. Davis v. Revenue Cabinet, No. 03CI03282, 2004 WL 5358776, at *2 (Ky. Cir. Ct.
Aug. 20, 2004). The Commerce Clause vests in Congress the power "[t]o regulate Com-
merce... among the several states." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. Davis, 2004 WL 5358776 at *2.
10. Id. at *4-5.
11. Id. at *4. The trial court stated that "[t]his practice can be analogized to granting
property tax breaks to various businesses, but not to others, in order to encourage busi-
nesses to remain in the state." Id. (alteration in original) (citing Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S.
429 (1980)).
12. Davis v. Dep't of Revenue of the Fin. & Admin. Cabinet, 197 S.W.3d 557, 566 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2006).
13. Davis, 197 S.W.3d at 564.
14. Id.
15. Id. The court noted:
Kentucky's bond taxation system is facially unconstitutional as it obviously affords
more favorable taxation treatment to in-state bonds than it does to extraterritorially
issued bonds. Thus, Kentucky's bond taxation system may be constitutionally valid
only if it falls within an exception to the normal rule requiring laws that violate the
Commerce Clause on their face be stricken.
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After the Supreme Court of Kentucky denied the Common-
wealth's petition for review, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider whether Kentucky's tax scheme in-
deed violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. 16 Justice Souter,
writing for the majority, held that it did not.17 He began the con-
stitutional analysis by the observing that, when the Dormant
Commerce Clause is invoked, the first question is whether the
"law discriminates against interstate commerce."' 8 If it does, he
wrote, then it is presumptively unconstitutional unless it pro-
motes a legitimate function that cannot be appropriately sup-
ported by a non-discriminatory means. 19 If it does not, he contin-
ued, then the law will stand unless its encumbrance on interstate
commerce is patently disproportionate to the purported local bene-
fits. 20
However, Justice Souter also explained that some cases present
an exception to this usual protocol and require an analysis outside
standard Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.21 According to the
majority, of dispositive importance for this case was the "govern-
ment function" exception ensconced in the opinion of United Haul-
ers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Author-
ity.22
Justice Souter explained that, in United Haulers, the Court
found constitutional significance between laws favoring in-state
private entities over out-of-state private businesses and laws fa-
voring State and local government over out-of-state competition.
23
Id. at 562 (footnotes omitted).
16. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1801, 1808.
17. Id. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Breyer, Scalia and Ginsburg joined
this portion of Justice Souter's opinion. Id. at 1804.
18. Id. at 1808. '"[D]iscrimination' simply means differential treatment of in-state and
out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter." Or. Waste
Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
19. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808. The Court observed: "A discriminatory law is 'virtually
per se invalid."' Id. (quoting Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 99). It "will survive only if it 'ad-
vances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondis-
criminatory alternatives."' Id. (quoting Or. Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 101).
20. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808. The Court explained: "Absent discrimination for the
forbidden purpose, however, the law 'will be upheld unless the burden imposed on [inter-
state] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."' Id. (altera-
tion in original) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
21. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1809.
22. Id. at 1809-10 (citing United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007)). Justice Souter stated: "In United Haulers, we explained
that a government function is not susceptible to standard dormant Commerce Clause scru-
tiny .. " Id. at 1810 (alteration in original).
23. Id. at 1809.
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He noted that the United Haulers Court believed that laws partial
to states and localities-as opposed to purely private in-state enti-
ties-were not likely to be aimed at the economic protectionism
that the Clause loathes. 24 Rather, he explained, these laws were
more likely to be focused on allowing the State to execute those
duties traditionally reserved for state government, e.g., protecting
the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.25 Thus, Justice
Souter recognized that the majority's conclusion in United Haulers
was that laws serving these so-called "local government functions"
were deserving of non-standard Dormant Commerce Clause ex-
amination.26
Applying this rationale to the case sub judice,27 the majority
found that Kentucky's differential tax scheme passed constitu-
tional muster.28 The Court observed that the proceeds from mu-
nicipal bonds were used to fund various public projects tradition-
ally undertaken by the State, such as education and transporta-
tion. 29 To that extent, the Court determined that the exemption
favoring them was not aimed at the economic protectionism the
Clause almost always forbids; rather, it was aimed at promoting
archetypical local government functions.
30
With the public nature of the program supported by the tax
scheme ascertained, the majority explained that it could now con-
front an essential component of the Dormant Commerce Clause
inquiry: discrimination. 31 Justice Souter observed that the Court
was obliged to consider whether or not comparable entities existed
in the case because any claim of discrimination presupposed an
24. Id. As Justice Souter observed, 'e found '[clompelling reasons' for 'treating [the
ordinance] differently from laws favoring particular private business over their competi-
tors."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795).
25. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1809. The majority opined that:
State and local governments that provide public goods and services on their own,
unlike private businesses, are "vested with the responsibility of protecting the health,
safety, and welfare of [their] citizens," and laws favoring such States and their subdi-
visions may "be directed toward any number of legitimate goals unrelated to protec-
tionism." That was true in United Haulers, where the ordinance addressed waste
disposal, "both typically and traditionally a local government function."
Id. (quoting United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795-96).
26. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810.
27. In Latin, "sub judice" translates as "under a judge." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1466
(8th ed. 2004). It means "[b]efore the court or judge for determination; at bar." Id.
28. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1810.
31. Id. at 1811.
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evaluation of substantially similar forms. 32 To that extent, the
majority noted that the Court's prior decisions have held that
states should be treated as private parties with regard to the mu-
nicipal bonds that have left their boundaries. 33 This being the
case, the majority found that Kentucky's tax exemption benefitted
a public entity and treated all private bond issuers alike.34 As a
result, the Court held that no unconstitutional discrimination ex-
isted because Kentucky, as a public entity, was not comparable to
other states, which were private entities for purposes of municipal
bonds that leave their borders.35 Thus, the majority upheld the
tax scheme because it supported traditional government functions
without discriminating against comparable extraterritorial inter-
ests in favor of local private entities.
36
Despite garnering a majority of votes using the United Haulers
analysis, Justice Souter, joined by a plurality of Justices, went
further and analyzed the case under another exception to stan-
dard Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny: the "market-
participant" exception.37 Justice Souter noted that, in order to
qualify for this exception, a state must transcend the bounds of
normal regulation and actually partake in the market when favor-
ing its own citizens over citizens of other states. 38 He then applied
this test to the instant case by addressing the Davises' contention
that the tax at issue was the epitome of market regulation because
it imposed a higher tax on out-of-state municipal bonds than it did
on in-state municipal bonds. 39 He observed that this argument
would be true if Kentucky acted in separate roles of issuing debt
32. Id. Justice Souter stated: "this emphasis on the public character of the enterprise
supported by the tax preference is just a step in addressing a fundamental element of Dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the principle that 'any notion of discrimination
assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities."' Id. (quoting United Haulers, 127
S. Ct. at 1795).
33. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811 (citing Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592 (1882)).
34. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. (plurality opinion). Justices Stevens and Breyer joined this portion of Justice
Souter's opinion. Id. at 1804.
38. Id. at 1809 (majority opinion). Indeed, the "market-participant" exception "covers
States that go beyond regulation and themselves 'participat[e] in the market' so as to exer-
cis[e] the right to favor [their] own citizens over others."' Id. (alterations in original) (quot-
ing Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976)). It "reflects a 'basic dis-
tinction ... between States as market participants and States as market regulators, ...
[t]here [being] no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States them-
selves to operate freely in the free market."' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Reeves v.
Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980)).
39. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811-12 (plurality opinion).
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securities and fixing taxes, but Kentucky's tax scheme was ra-
tional only because it simultaneously participated in the bond
market. 40  Thus, the plurality stressed, the Court's "market-
participant" cases stand for the very proposition that the Davises
would have the Court ignore: that some form of regulation accom-
panying a government's commercial venture provides the excep-
tion to the rule. 41 In this light, the plurality decided that the
Commonwealth's tax scheme was constitutional because it was
enacted with the purpose of benefitting the public through a vehi-
cle in which the State participated: the municipal bond market.
42
Next, Justice Souter, again writing for a majority, examined the
markets affected by the exemption to verify that no illicit dis-
crimination was occurring.43 First, he looked at the broad market
of all fixed-income securities, including bonds that were privately
issued, and noted that Kentucky treated all bonds, other than the
ones it issued, the same.44 Second, he explored the narrower mar-
ket of municipal bonds themselves, commenting that, although the
effects of the differential tax scheme were most obvious in this
forum, it was truly notable that almost every state supported it.
45
Lastly, he remarked that striking down the exemption could have
potentially devastating effects on single-state municipal bond
funds.46 In the aggregate, the majority found that these consid-
erations denoted the essential nature of the tax scheme and con-
firmed that the Dormant Commerce Clause should not strike it
down as discriminatory.
47
As a final matter, the majority addressed the application of the
Pike48 balancing test.49 After a cursory review of its specifications,
the Court declined, for several reasons, to apply it to the facts of
40. Id. at 1812.
41. Id. at 1813-14. The plurality stated:
In sum, our cases on market regulation without market participation prescribe stan-
dard dormant Commerce Clause analysis; our cases on market participation joined
with regulation (the usual situation) prescribe exceptional treatment for this direct
governmental activity in commercial markets for the public's benefit.
Id. at 1814 (footnote omitted).
42. Id. at 1814.
43. Id. at 1815 (majority opinion). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Breyer,
Scalia, and Ginsburg join this portion of the Justice Souter's opinion. Id. at 1804.
44. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1815.
45. Id. at 1815-16.
46. Id. at 1816.
47. Id. at 1817.
48. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. See supra text accompanying note 20.
49. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1817. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Breyer, and
Ginsburg joined this portion of Justice Souter's opinion. Id. at 1804.
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the case.50 First, the majority recognized that state courts did not
make the inquiry and the Davises requested a remand so that one
could be made. 51 Second, it noted that the application of Pike to
cases of this kind was uncertain because, although United Haulers
included the analysis, the "market-participant" cases did not.
52
Third, the Court noted that the Commonwealth did not argue the
inapplicability of Pike. Finally, it voiced its concern over the judi-
ciary's qualifications to engage in the acute level of analysis re-
quired for a law of this sort. 53 Thus, the Court reversed and re-
manded the case for further proceedings.
54
Justice Stevens concurred in order to explain why he joined Jus-
tice Souter's opinion in toto despite having dissented in both
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake55 and United Haulers.56 According to Justice
Stevens, both Reeves and United Haulers involved state participa-
tion in a private commercial market on which the state also im-
posed burdens.57 For him, this situation was fundamentally differ-
ent from the scenario where a state does not participate in any
private commercial enterprise, such as when it borrows money in
order to bankroll public works projects. 58 In this latter scenario,
he reasoned that the State does not manage a commercial venture
for purposes of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 59 Accordingly, he
agreed that Kentucky's tax scheme withstood the constitutional
attack in this case.
60
Chief Justice Roberts also concurred with Justice Souter, but
only in part.61 He did not believe that the "market-participant"




53. Id. at 1817-18. Justice Souter stated:
The institutional difficulty is manifest in the very train of disadvantages that the
Davises' counsel attributes to the current differential tax scheme .... Even if each of
these drawbacks does to some degree eventuate from the system, it must be apparent
to anyone that weighing or quantifying them for a cost-benefit analysis would be a
very subtle exercise.
Id.
54. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1819.
55. 447 U.S. 429 (1980). Reeves was a "market participant" case. Id. See supra text
accompanying note 37.
56. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1819 (Stevens, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 1819-20.
58. Id. at 1820.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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quately resolved the case.62 Justice Scalia similarly concurred,
but he went further to disavow the Pike test discussed by the ma-
jority.63 According to him, it should be altogether abandoned.
64
Justice Thomas concurred as well, but only in the judgment.
65
He iterated his desire for the Court to abandon its Dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence because he believes that it lacks a
constitutional foundation.66 Accordingly, he expressed the view
that the tax scheme should be upheld because the Court lacked
the power to overturn it.67
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito, dissented.68 He criti-
cized the majority's assertion that Kentucky's tax scheme was
valid because it enabled the Commonwealth to discharge the tra-
ditional government functions of protecting the health, safety, and
welfare of its people. 69 According to him, the majority merely re-
stated the principle that a state may act within its police powers.
70
He contended that their argument was circular because whether
or not something is within a state's police powers depends on
whether or not the Constitution permits the act. 71 Indeed, Justice
Kennedy declared, the mere fact something is asserted to be
within a state's police powers does not thereby exempt it from
Commerce Clause scrutiny.
72
Viewed through this lens, Justice Kennedy concluded that the
majority distorted the true issue in the case by focusing on bond
issuance.7 3 In his opinion, the law truly in question-Kentucky's
income tax exemption-was not directed toward protecting the
health, safety, and welfare of the people. 74 To the contrary, it af-
62. Id.
63. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1821 (Thomas, J., concurring).
66. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1821-22 (Thomas, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 1822.
68. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1824.
70. Id.
71. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1824 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy framed his
position thusly:
The police power concept is simply a shorthand way of saying that a State is empow-
ered to enact laws in the absence of constitutional constraints; but, of course, that
only restates the question. That a law has the police power label-as all laws do-
does not exempt it from Commerce Clause analysis.
Id.
72. Id. at 1824.
73. Id. at 1825.
74. Id.
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fected only the holders of the bond, not the issuers. 75 Accordingly,
Justice Kennedy submitted that the customary rule that a state
may not construct barricades to interstate commerce through the
use of its taxing power should apply.
7 6
Additionally, Justice Kennedy distinguished United Haulers
from the instant case. 77 He believed the majority ignored the fact
that the ordinance in United Haulers applied even-handedly to
both intrastate and interstate commerce because government had
monopolized the refuse industry.78 Thus, he determined the ordi-
nance in that case, unlike the expressed purpose of the law in the
instant case, did not discriminate.
7 9
Finally, Justice Kennedy briefly addressed the plurality's "mar-
ket-participant" analysis.80 He stated that taxation was in no way
market participation, but the paradigmatic act of regulation.81
Moreover, he noted, even if it were participation, it would still fail
because of its downstream regulation.
8 2
He concluded by stating that the Court's concern over the poten-
tial disruption in the bond market if the law were to be overruled
was legitimate.8 3 However, he noted that if the Court wished to
uphold the law on that basis, it should make a sui generis excep-
tion.8
4
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court in-
validates state laws that, by their essential nature, regulate inter-
75. Id.
76. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy first reviewed
various cases involving taxation of securities to support this proposition. See Boston Stock
Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S.
263 (1984). From these cases he concluded that:
[tihe relevant inquiry is not the purpose of a bond but whether [a bond competes].
The majority cannot establish that, from an investor's standpoint, Kentucky's bonds
do not compete with bonds from other state or municipal governments. Indeed, that
competition is why the bonds need the advantages the exemptions give them.
Id. at 1825-26 (alteration in original). He then reviewed cases involving regulation of other
commodities, see, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (involving discrimina-
tory regulation of mill in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause), to support the same
conclusion. Id. at 1826-27.
77. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1827 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1829.
81. Id.
82. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1830 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing South-Central Timber
Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (plurality opinion)).
83. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1830 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
84. Id. Justice Alito added a brief statement after Justice Kennedy's opinion agreeing
with Justice Kennedy and stating his belief that "the Court's established dormant Com-
merce Clause precedents should be followed .. " Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). In Latin, "sui
generis" means "of its own kind." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (8th ed. 2004).
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state commerce. 85 However, one searches the text of the Constitu-
tion in vain when seeking to find the "Dormant" Commerce Clause
because the Constitution itself does not contain such a provision.
8 6
Rather, the Dormant Commerce Clause is a negative implication
that the Supreme Court has drawn from the fact that the Consti-
tution expressly grants Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce.8 7 The reasoning is that because Congress has the
power to regulate, concomitant restrictions must be placed on the
states from regulating.88 Thus, the Supreme Court strikes down
those state laws that, by virtue of their protectionist aspects, regu-
late commerce among the several states.
8 9
The genesis of the Court's Dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence can be traced back to Chief Justice Marshall and his opinion
in Gibbons v. Ogden.90 However, the first authoritative ruling on
the issue did not come until 1851 when the Taney Court decided
Cooley v. Board of Wardens.91 In Cooley, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania law that required ships enter-
ing or leaving Philadelphia harbor to employ a local pilot to guide
them through the waters of the Delaware River. 92 After noting
that the regulation of pilots undoubtedly constituted a commercial
regulation, the court then considered the central question of
whether Congress's express authority to regulate interstate com-
merce per se deprived the States of any power to do so. 93 In hold-
ing that it did not, the Court articulated a rule that focused pri-
marily on the subject of the regulation. 94 Indeed, the majority ob-
85. See KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 245 (15th ed.
2004).
86. See id.
87. See id. See also supra text accompanying note 8.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (dictum) (opinion by Marshall, C.J.). Gibbons addressed
a New York steamboat monopoly law that the Court ultimately invalidated under the Su-
premacy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 1, 81. How-
ever, in dicta, the Chief Justice observed that "when a State proceeds to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, or among the several States, it is exercising the very power that is
granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to do." Id. at
76.
91. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (overruled in part by Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)). See generally DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE 217-18 (2004) ("the Court came together... to declare that the grant of
commerce power in and of itself barred some state legislation by rendering congressional
power 'exclusive' as to 'subjects ... in their nature national.-).
92. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 311-12.
93. Id. at 318.
94. Id. at 319.
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served that the nature of certain subjects required a uniform na-
tional standard, while the nature of others required national di-
versity in order to meet local needs.95 State laws falling into the
former category, the Court opined, would be struck down even in
the absence of federal legislation, while state laws falling into the
latter category would be upheld, provided that no federal law pre-
empted it.96 Because the Court determined that the Pennsylvania
law at issue fell into the latter category, the Court upheld it.
9 7
Since Cooley, the Court's framework for deciding Dormant
Commerce Clause cases has evolved considerably. 98 From a func-
tional standpoint, modern cases now analyze allegedly unconstitu-
tional state laws based upon whether or not they discriminate
against interstate commerce. 99 On the one hand, the Court has
held that a discriminatory law-i.e., a law that treats in-state and
out-of-state economic interests differently to the benefit of the
former and to the detriment of the latter-is subject to a virtually
per se rule of invalidity. 100 For instance, in City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey0 1 the Court invalidated a New Jersey law that prohib-
ited the importation of most solid and liquid waste originating
outside of the State.10 2 In reaching its decision, the Court relied
on the fact that the law imposed the full burden of conserving New
Jersey's remaining landfill space on out-of-state commercial enti-
ties.10 3 According to the Court, this economic barrier was exactly
the sort of scheme the Commerce Clause prohibited and was thus
unconstitutional. 104
95. Id. Justice Curtis observed:
[T]he power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only many,
but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively de-
manding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United
States in every port; and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively de-
manding that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.
Id.
96. Id. at 319-21.
97. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 320.
98. See generally BORIS I. BITTKER WITH THE COLLABORATION OF BRANNON P. DENNING,
BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE §§ 6.01-6.08 (1999)
(reviewing and analyzing the evolution of Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
99. See C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994); see also supra text
accompanying notes 18-20.
100. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); see also supra text
accompanying note 18 and 19.
101. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).





On the other hand, the Court held in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.10 5 that even a nondiscriminatory law-i.e., a law that regu-
lates even-handedly-should be invalidated if its burden on inter-
state commerce is clearly excessive in relation to its purported
local benefits. 0 6 In Pike, the Court invalidated an Arizona law
that required Arizona-grown cantaloupes to advertise their State
of origin on their packages.'0 7 The majority determine the burden
of forcing Arizona growers to use packaging facilities-whether
located in-state or out-of-state-that would place the required
identification on the package was simply too great in relation to
the putative local benefit of enhancing the reputation of in-state
growers. 0 8 The Court therefore determined that, although the
law applied even-handedly, it had to fail based on the degree of
encumbrance it imposed on interstate commerce. 10 9
From a fundamental standpoint, the Court has stated that the
goal of the modern approach is to effectuate the Framers' intent
for national unity with respect to interstate commerce in order to
prevent the economic "Balkanization"110 that wreaked havoc on
the economies of the States under the Articles of Confederation."'
Given this goal, the Court has determined that certain genera of
cases should be accorded a different analysis because they do not
burden interstate commerce in a way that the Dormant Commerce
Clause was designed to prevent." 2 Indeed, the most recent varia-
tion from the standard discrimination/non-discrimination line of
analysis-the "government function" exception-was first commu-
nicated in the dissent in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown."3
Carbone involved a "flow control" ordinance that required trash
haulers to remit solid refuse to a privately owned and operated
waste processing facility."14 The ordinance was adopted in order
105. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
106. Id. at 142; see also supra text accompanying note 20.
107. Id. at 146.
108. Id. at 143-45.
109. Id.
110. "Balkanization" means "to break up (as a region) into smaller ineffectual and fre-
quently conflicting units." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 166 (Philip
Babcock Gove ed., Merriam Webster, Inc. 1986) (1961) (defining "balkanize').
111. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
112. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (articulating the
"market-participant" exception); United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1796 (espousing the "gov-
ernment function" variation).
113. 511 U.S. at 410 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Blackmun joined Justice Souter in dissent. Id.
114. Id. at 386-87 (majority opinion). Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion
and was joined by Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg. Id. at 384.
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to allow the town of Clarkstown to fulfill contractual obligations to
the private company that built the facility. 115 Under the terms of
the contract, Clarkstown guaranteed the facility a certain tonnage
of waste per year, for which the contractor could charge an above-
market-rate "tipping fee. 11 6 At the end of the contract term, the
town would then buy the facility for the nominal amount of $1."
7
Thus, the agreement, coupled with the flow control ordinance, al-
lowed the town to finance the building of a facility that it would
eventually own and operate." 8
The ordinance was challenged on the assertion that it unconsti-
tutionally discriminated against interstate commerce.1 19 While
the majority agreed that it did indeed violate the Dormant Com-
merce Clause because it favored an in-state processor over out-of-
state competition, 20 the dissent drew an important distinction
between this particular ordinance and other laws that were struck
down based on their discriminatory effects.' 2' According to Justice
Souter, the processing facility-despite the fact that a private
company held title-was essentially a municipal facility.122  In
support of this assertion, he indicated that the facility itself per-
formed a function traditionally falling to state or local govern-
ment. 23 Furthermore, he noted that the town would eventually
own the facility. 24 This background knowledge, Justice Souter
contended, made the flow control ordinance fundamentally differ-
ent from laws favoring purely private interests because laws favor-
ing local government-as this law did-were more likely aimed at
115. Id. at 387.
116. Id. at 386-87. "Tipping fees are disposal charges levied against collectors who drop
off waste at a processing facility. They are called 'tipping' fees because garbage trucks
literally tip their back end to dump out carried waste." United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1791.
117. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387.
118. Id. The Court observed: "The object of this arrangement was to amortize the cost of
the transfer station. The town would finance its new facility with the income generated by
the tipping fees." Id.
119. Id. at 388.
120. Id. at 391. The majority stated: "the flow control ordinance is just one more in-
stance of local processing requirements we have held invalid." Id.
121. Id. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting).
122. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 419 (Souter, J., dissenting).
123. Id.
124. Id. Justice Souter contended:
While our previous local processing cases have barred discrimination in markets
served by private companies, Clarkstown's transfer station is essentially a municipal
facility, built and operated under a contract with the municipality and soon to revert
entirely to municipal ownership. This, of course, is no mere coincidence, since the fa-
cility performs a municipal function that tradition as well as state and federal law
recognize as the domain of local government.
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serving the public interest rather than at economic protection-
ism. 125 As such, he declared that they were deserving of different
constitutional treatment under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
126
Therefore, he found the majority's invalidation of the law under
traditional principles unwarranted.127
The Court's first examination of the public-private distinction
espoused by the Carbone dissenters came in United Haulers Ass'n
v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority,128 a case
involving a flow control ordinance very similar to the one in Car-
bone.129 Unlike Carbone, however, the ordinance in United Haul-
ers required trash haulers to remit solid refuse to a publicly owned
and operated processing facility. 130 In deciding whether the ordi-
nance discriminated against interstate commerce for Dormant
Commerce Clause purposes, the Court deemed it necessary to dis-
tinguish its Carbone decision. 131 Chief Justice Roberts observed
that the Carbone majority did not address the public-private dis-
tinction made by the dissent. 132 As a result, he concluded that
that case left open the question of whether laws favoring local
government over private business should be treated differently
than laws aimed at protecting local private entities over out-of-
state competition. 33 The Chief Justice found compelling reasons
for answering in the affirmative.1
34
125. Id. at 420-21. The dissent stated:
[PIrivate businesses, whether local or out of State, first serve the private interests of
their owners, and there is therefore only rarely a reason other than economic protec-
tionism for favoring local businesses over their out out-of-town competitors. The local
government itself occupies a very different market position, however, being the one
entity that enters the market to serve the public interest of local citizens quite apart
from private interest in private gain. Reasons other than economic protectionism are
accordingly more likely to explain the design and effect of an ordinance that favors a
public facility.
Id.
126. Id. at 421.
127. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 422-23.
128. 127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007).
129. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1790.
130. Id.
131. Id. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the majority opinion and was joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Scalia. Id. at 1789-90.
132. Id. at 1793-94.
133. Id. at 1794. The Chief Justice noted that, "[a]s the Second Circuit explained, 'in
Carbone the Justices were divided over the fact of whether the favored facility was public or
private, rather than on the import of that distinction."' Id. (quoting United Haulers Ass'n
v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 261 F.3d 245, 259 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasis
in original)).
134. United Haulers. 127 S. Ct. at 1795.
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He noted that the notion of discrimination presupposes a juxta-
position of substantially similar entities. 135 To that extent, he re-
marked that government and private business were two distinct
entities with separate objectives. 136 Unlike private business, citi-
zens entrust government with the responsibility of protecting
health, safety, and welfare. 137 Given these general objectives, the
majority deduced that laws favoring State or local government
were less likely to be aimed at economic protection and more likely
to be directed at allowing government to do that which its citizens
entrust it to do.' 38 Moreover, the majority surmised, the alterna-
tive approach would lead to unprecedented and illimitable judicial
interference with the administration of state and local govern-
ment.139 As a result, the Court concluded that the flow control
ordinance did not discriminate against interstate commerce for
purposes of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
140
After coming to their respective conclusions on the public-
private distinction, the dissent in Carbone and a plurality in
United Haulers found it necessary to analyze the flow control or-
dinances under the Pike test. 141 Both noted that courts employ
this test when they determine that a challenged law does not by
its terms discriminate but rather is aimed at legitimate local con-
cerns and has only incidental effects on interstate commerce.
142
Both observed that the test provides that a nondiscriminatory law
135. Id. (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1795-96. Chief Justice Roberts wrote:
As our local processing cases demonstrate, when a law favors in-state business over
out-of-state competition, rigorous scrutiny is appropriate because the law is often the
product of "simple economic protectionism." Laws favoring local government, by con-
trast, may be directed toward any number of legitimate goals unrelated to protection-
ism. Here the flow control ordinances enable the Counties to pursue particular poli-
cies with respect to the handling and treatment of waste generated in the Counties,
while allocating the costs of those policies on citizens and businesses according to the
volume of waste they generate.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
139. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1796.
140. Id. at 1797.
141. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 423 (Souter, J., dissenting); United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at
1789.
142. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1797; Carbone 511 U.S. at 423. The United Haulers
Court affirmed that the Pike test is "reserved for local laws 'directed to legitimate local
concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental."' United Haulers,
127 S. Ct. at 1797 (citing City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624).
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will be upheld unless its burden on interstate commerce is pat-
ently disproportionate to the purported local benefits.
143
Applying the Pike test to the facts of Carbone, Justice Souter de-
termined that the burdens attendant to the ordinance fell primar-
ily on the citizens of Clarkstown since they would be paying more
for the waste processing services. 144 Likewise, he observed that no
evidence existed to show that the ordinance resulted in a decrease
in trash flow to out-of-state facilities. 145 To the contrary, he com-
mented, the only facility that likely lost business was the Clark-
stown facility itself due to its increased tipping fees. 146 When
weighed in relation to the putative benefits, Justice Souter deter-
mined that the ordinance clearly passed the Pike test. 47 Indeed,
he remarked, State and local government have a duty to provide
safe sanitation services despite whether private enterprise decides
to enter the market. 148 Thus, he concluded that the town could
legitimately minimize the risk of financing and building a process-
ing facility by entering the arrangement it did.
49
The United Haulers plurality likewise found that the ordinance
passed the Pike test.150 However, Chief Justice Roberts deemed it
unnecessary to consider whether there were any incidental bur-
dens on interstate commerce because he determined that the pub-
lic benefits outweighed any possible burdens. 151 According to the
Chief Justice, the health and environmental benefits resultant
from the ordinance in terms of encouraging recycling could not
possibly be exceeded by any conceivable burden on interstate
commerce. 152 Thus, the plurality sustained the ordinance's valid-
ity. 53
143. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1797 (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 142); Carbone 511 U.S.
at 423 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Pike, 397 U.S. at 423). See also supra text accompany-
ing note 20.
144. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 427 (Souter, J. dissenting).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 428.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 429. The dissent observed: "Protection of the public fisc is a
legitimate local benefit directly advanced by the ordinance and quite unlike the generalized
advantage to local business that we have condemned as protectionist in the past." Id.
150. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1797 (plurality opinion).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1798. The plurality stated: "First, they create enhanced incentives for recy-
cling and proper disposal of other kinds of waste.... Second, by requiring all waste to be
deposited at Authority facilities, the Counties have markedly increased their ability to
enforce recycling laws." Id.
153. Id.
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When looking at Davis in light of Carbone and United Haulers,
two noteworthy issues present themselves. The first issue is rec-
onciling the Davis rationale with that of United Haulers in so far
as determining whether unconstitutional discrimination exists.
Indeed, the Davis Court opined that the tax program was unlikely
to be aimed at economic protectionism because it favored and
helped fund a "government function."15 4 Furthermore, it asserted
that Kentucky's tax law favored a public enterprise while treating
all private businesses the same. 155 For this proposition, the Court
relied on a Full Faith and Credit Clause' 56 case from 1882 in
which the Court held that a State should be treated as a private
entity with regard to municipal bonds that leave its borders.
157 All
of this background considered, the Court concluded that the tax
scheme did not discriminate against interstate commerce for
Commerce Clause purposes.
158
But that line of reasoning does not exactly comport with the
United Haulers rationale. In United Haulers, the Court held that
States and municipalities were unlike private business because
they act with different objectives, not likely to be aimed at eco-
nomic protectionism. 159 It was this reason that made the private
and public entities not substantially similar and worthy of a dif-
ferent level of constitutional scrutiny.1
60
The incongruity lies in the fact that the tax law at issue in
Davis did not imply that Kentucky acted with objectives different
from those of other states. To the contrary, Kentucky's law is al-
most identical to the laws of thirty-six other States and compara-
ble to the laws of five other.161 Also, states that have enacted a
law similar to Kentucky's have the exact same objective: protect-
154. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810-11.
155. Id. at 1811.
156. The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides: "Full faith and credit shall be given in
each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state." U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 1.
157. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811 (citing Bonaparte, 104 U.S. at 595). The Bonaparte Court
held:
It is true, if a State could protect its securities from taxation everywhere, it might
succeed in borrowing money at reduced interest; but, inasmuch as it cannot secure
such exemption outside of its own jurisdiction, it is compelled to go into the market as
a borrower, subject to the same disabilities in this particular as individuals.
Bonaparte, 104 U.S. at 595.
158. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1811.
159. United Haulers, 127 S. Ct. at 1795.
160. Id. at 1795-96.
161. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1807 n.7.
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ing the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. 162 So in real-
ity, both the public enterprise and the "private" enterprise in
Davis were acting with the same motivation. In that sense, they
are substantially similar. The only way they can possibly be con-
sidered different is to draw the technical distinction employed by
the Davis majority. The Court therefore seems to have elevated
form over substance in terms of deciding whether or not the law
"discriminated" for purposes of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Thus, Justice Souter appears to have committed the same sort of
formalistic error that he argued so vigorously against in his Car-
bone dissent. 163 The result reached in Davis is not necessarily
bad, however, because the opposite outcome could have had a po-
tentially devastating economic impact. Nonetheless, it does sug-
gest that the Court was stretching the bounds of its recently ar-
ticulated "government function" exception in order to obtain the
desired result without going outside of its own decisional law.
Perhaps, then, the majority would have been better served if it
had not tried to circumvent the fact that the law in question did
discriminate and taken Justice Kennedy's advice concerning a sui
generis exception. 1
64
This discussion leads to the second issue presented by the Davis
decision: the continued viability of the Pike test.165 Despite its ap-
plication by the United Haulers plurality and the Carbone dissent,
the Davis Court left open the question of whether Pike should ap-
ply to the Court's "government function" cases.166 Though inter-
esting, this decision is unsurprising. Because the Kentucky law at
issue did in a very real way discriminate against interstate com-
merce, it would have been very difficult for the Court to conduct
any meaningful analysis. Moreover, by inviting a challenge to
Pike as it applies to the "government function" case, the Court will
be sure to give itself the opportunity to clarify and refine the scope
of the exception.
What was interesting as well as surprising, however, was ma-
jority's seemingly more general criticism of Pike. 167 Indeed, by
noting its own institutional inadequacy for engaging in the subtle
162. See id. at 1805-07.
163. See Carbone, 511 U.S. at 419-21.
164. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1830.
165. Id. at 1817.
166. Id. at 1817-19. Interestingly, Justice Souter couched his Pike comments in more
comprehensive terms, perhaps hinting at the test's general inadequacy. See id.
167. See id. at 1817-19.
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cost-benefit analysis that Pike requires, 168 the Court may be posi-
tioning itself for a wholesale abandonment of the doctrine. The
result would be the demise of a staple principle that is perhaps the
most disagreeable aspect of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 169
In conclusion, Davis highlights the difficulties that courts will
encounter in applying the new "government function" caveat.
1 70
To be sure, its feasibility and overall sphere of influence remain to
be seen. One thing is certain, however. Litigation involving the
Dormant Commerce Clause and the meaning and extent of the
"government function" exception is certain to follow.
Gregory V. Aughenbaugh
168. Id. at 1817-18.
169. See Michael A. Lawrence, Towards a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A
Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 395, 427-29 (1998) (discussing
several criticisms of Pike).
170. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1810. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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